We present a synthesis of all the available empirical evidence in the light of recent theoretical developments for the existence of characteristic log-periodic signatures of growing bubbles in a variety of markets including 8 unrelated crashes from 1929 to 1998 on stock markets as diverse as the US, Hong-Kong or the Russian market and on currencies. To our knowledge, no major financial crash preceded by an extended bubble has occurred in the past 2 decades without exhibiting a similar log-periodic signature.
Introduction
Two recent papers [1, 2] have presented increasing evidence on the Oct. 1929, Oct. 1987 , Oct. 1987 Hong-Kong crashes, on the Aug. 1998 global market events and on the 1985 Forex event on the US dollar, for the hypothesis advanced three years ago [4] that stock market crashes are caused by the slow buildup of long-range correlations between traders leading to a collapse of the stock market in one critical instant, with specific "log-periodic" precursory signatures. In addition, intensive statistical tests have been performed [2, 3] to show that the reported "log-periodic" structures essentially never occured in ≈ 10 5 years of synthetic trading following a GARCH(1,1) with student-t statistics. Thus, the null hypothesis that log-periodicity could result from random fluctuations is strongly rejected.
From a theoretical view point, we have proposed a rational expectation model of bubbles and crashes, which has two main components : (1) we assume that a crash may be caused by local self-reinforcing imitation processes between noise traders that can be quantified by the theory of critical phenomena developed in the Physical Sciences ; (2) we allow for a remuneration of the risk of a crash by a higher rate of growth of the bubble, which reflects that the crash is not a certain deterministic outcome of the bubble and, as a consequence, it remains rational for traders to remain invested provided they are suitably compensated.
Since our initial proposition [4] , several works have extended the empirical investigation [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] and the theoretical framework in terms of critical phenomena [12, 13] . However, a recent article of opinion [14] and a short assessment note [15] have raised concerns about the reality of the log-periodic signatures preceding crashes and the relevance of the concept of critical phenomena to financial crashes.
The purpose of the present paper is mainly to present a complete up-to-date synthesis of the available evidence, that contains all previously reported cases together with four new cases which include the correction on the US dollar against the Canadian dollar and the Japanese Yen starting in June 1998, as well as the bubble on the Russian market and its ensuing collapse in June 1997. We are able to exhibit a remarkable universality of the results for all events, with essentially the same value of the fundamental scaling ratio λ which characterises the log-periodic structures. We also address briefly the concern raised by Ilinski [15] about the validity of our theory [1, 2] .
Theoretical framework
In order to put the empirical analysis in perspective, it is useful to recapitulate the main features of the model [1, 2] . This will also allows us to stress its robustness with respect to other choices in the model construction and address the criticism made by Ilinski [15] .
Ingredients
• Our key assumption is that a crash may be caused by local self-reinforcing imitation between traders. This self-reinforcing imitation process leads to the blossoming of a bubble. If the tendency for traders to "imitate" their "friends" increases up to a certain point called the "critical" point, many traders may place the same order (sell) at the same time, thus causing a crash. The interplay between the progressive strengthening of imitation and the ubiquity of noise requires a stochastic description : a crash is not certain but can be characterised by its hazard rate h(t),i.e., the probability per unit time that the crash will happen in the next instant provided it has not happened yet.
• Since the crash is not a certain deterministic outcome of the bubble, it remains rational for traders to remain invested provided they are compensated by a higher rate of growth of the bubble for taking the risk of a crash, because there is a finite probability of "landing smoothly", i.e., of attaining the end of the bubble without crash. In this model, the ability to predict the critical date is perfectly consistent with the behaviour of the rational agents: they all know this date, the crash may happen anyway, and they are unable to make any abnormal risk-adjusted profits by using this information.
Our model distinguishes between the end of the bubble and the time of the crash : the rational expectation constraint has the specific implication that the date of the crash must have some degree of randomness. The theoretical death of the bubble is not the time of the crash because the crash could happen at any time before, even though this is not very likely. The death of the bubble is the most probable time for the crash.
The model does not impose any constraint on the amplitude of the crash. If we assume it proportional to the current price level, then the natural variable is the logarithm of the price. If instead, we assume that the crash amplitude is a finite fraction of the gain observed during the bubble, then the natural variable is the price itself [1] . We are aware that the standard economical proxy is the logarithm of the price and not the price itself, since only relative variations should play a role. However, as we shall see below, different price dynamics give both possibilities.
In the stylised framework of a purely speculative asset that pays no dividends and in which we ignore the interest rate, risk aversion, information asymmetry, and the marketclearing condition, rational expectations are simply equivalent to the familiar martingale hypothesis:
where p(t) denotes the price of the asset at time t and E t [·] denotes the expectation conditional on information revealed up to time t. We model the occurrence of a crash as a jump process j whose value is zero before the crash and one afterwards. The random nature of the crash occurrence is modeled by the cumulative distribution function Q(t) of the time of the crash, the probability density function q(t) = dQ/dt and the hazard rate h(t) = q(t)/[1 − Q(t)]. The hazard rate is the probability per unit of time that the crash will happen in the next instant provided it has not happened yet.
Assume for simplicity that, during a crash, the price drops by a fixed percentage κ ∈ (0, 1), say between 20 and 30% of the price increase above a reference value p 1 . Then, the dynamics of the asset price before the crash are given by:
where j denotes a jump process whose value is zero before the crash and one afterwards. Putting (2) in (1) leads to
In words, if the crash hazard rate h(t) increases, the return µ increases to compensate the traders for the increasing risk. Plugging (3) into (2), we obtain a ordinary differential
This regime applies to the relatively short time scales of two to three years prior to the crash studied here. If instead the price drops by a fixed percentage κ ∈ (0, 1) of the price, the dynamics of the asset price before the crash is given by dp = µ(t) p(t) dt − κp(t)dj
then we get E t [dp] = µ(t)p(t)dt − κp(t)h(t)dt = 0 .
This yields :
and the corresponding equation for the price is :
This gives the logarithm of the price as the relevant observable. It has successfully been applied to the 1929 and 1987 Wall Street crashes up to ≈ 7.5 years prior to the crash [2] . The higher the probability of a crash, the faster the price must increase (conditional on having no crash) in order to satisfy the martingale condition. Intuitively, investors must be compensated by a higher return in order to be induced to hold an asset that might crash. This is the only effect that we wish to capture in this part of the model. This effect is fairly standard, and it was pointed out earlier in a closely related model of bubbles and crashes under rational expectations by Blanchard ([16] , top of p.389). It may go against the naive preconception that price is adversely affected by the probability of the crash, but our result is the only one consistent with rational expectations. Notice that price is driven by the hazard rate of crash h(t).
Ilinski [15] raises the concern that the martingale condition (1) leads to a model which "assumes a zero return as the best prediction for the market." He continues ; "No need to say that this is not what one expects from a perfect model of market bubble! Buying shares, traders expect the price to rise and it is reflected (or caused) by their prediction model. They support the bubble and the bubble support them!".
In other words, Ilinski (1999) criticises a key economic hypothesis in our paper : market rationality. We capture this by assuming that the market level is expected to stay constant as written in equation (1) . Ilinski (1999) claims that this equation (1) is wrong because the market level does not stay constant in a bubble : it rises, almost by definition.
This misunderstanding addresses a rather subtle point of the model and stems from the difference between two different types of returns :
1. the unconditional return is indeed zero as seen from (1) and reflects the fair game condition.
2. The conditional return, conditioned upon no crash occurring between time t and time t ′ , is non-zero and is given by (3, 7) . If the crash hazard rate is increasing with time, the conditional return will be accelerating precisely because the crash becomes more probable and the investors need to be remunerated for their higher risk.
Thus, the expectation which remains constant in equation (1) takes into account the probability that the market may crash. Therefore, conditionally on staying in the bubble (no crash yet), the market must rationally rise to compensate buyers for having taken the risk that the market could have crashed.
The market price reflects the equilibrium between the greed of buyers who hope the bubble will inflate and the fear of sellers that it may crash. A bubble that goes up is just one that could have crashed but did not. Our model is well summarised by borrowing the words of another economist : "(...) the higher probability of a crash leads to an acceleration of [the market price] while the bubble lasts." Interestingly, this citation is culled from the very same article by Blanchard [16] that Ilinski [15] cites as an alternative model more realistic than ours. We see that this is in fact more of an endorsement than an alternative.
To go into the details, Blanchard's model [16] is slightly more general because it incorporates risk aversion through :
where ν ∈ (0, 1] is an appropriate discount factor. We have been aware of this since the beginning, and the only reason why we did not take it into account is that it obviously makes no difference in our substantive prediction (log-periodic oscillations), as long as ν remains bounded away from zero and infinity. Another way to incorporate risk aversion into our model is to say that the probability of a crash in the next instant is perceived by traders as being K times bigger than it objectively is. This amounts to multiplying our hazard rate h(t) by K, and once again this makes no substantive difference as long as K is bounded away from zero and infinity (a very weak restriction indeed).
The point here is that ν and K both represent general aversion of fixed magnitude against a risk. Risk aversion is a central feature of economic theory, and it is generally thought to be stable within a reasonable range, associated with slow-moving secular trends like changes in education, social structures and technology.
Ilinski [15] rightfully points out that risk perceptions are constantly changing in the course of real-life bubbles, but wrongfully claims that our model violates this intuition. In our model, risk perceptions do oscillate dramatically throughout the bubble, even though subjective aversion to risk remains stable, simply because the objective degree of risk that the bubble may burst goes through wild swings.
For these reasons, the criticisms put forth by Ilinski, far from making a dent in our economic model, serve instead to show that it is robust, flexible and intuitive.
Crash hazard rate and critical imitation model
The crash hazard rate h(t) quantifies the probability that a large group of agents place sell orders simultaneously and create enough of an imbalance in the order book for market makers to be unable to absorb the other side without lowering prices substantially. Most of the time, market agents disagree with one another, and submit roughly as many buy orders as sell orders (these are all the times when a crash does not happen). The key question is to determine by what mechanism did they suddenly manage to organise a coordinated sell-off?
We have proposed the following answer [2] : all the traders in the world are organised into a network (of family, friends, colleagues, etc) and they influence each other locally through this network : for instance, an active trader is constantly on the phone exchanging information and opinions with a set of selected colleagues. In addition, there are indirect interactions mediated for instance by the media. Specifically, if I am directly connected with k other traders, then there are only two forces that influence my opinion: (a) the opinions of these k people and of the global information network; and (b) an idiosyncratic signal that I alone generate. Our working assumption here is that agents tend to imitate the opinions of their connections. The force (a) will tend to create order, while force (b) will tend to create disorder. The main story here is a fight between order and disorder. As far as asset prices are concerned, a crash happens when order wins (everybody has the same opinion: selling), and normal times are when disorder wins (buyers and sellers disagree with each other and roughly balance each other out). This mechanism does not require an overarching coordination mechanism since macro-level coordination can arise from microlevel imitation and it relies on a realistic model of how agents form opinions by constant interactions.
Many models of interaction and imitation between traders have been developed. To make a long story short, the upshot is that the fight between order and disorder often leads to a regime where order may win. When this occurs, the bubble ends. Many models (but not all) undergo this transition in a "critical" manner : the sensitivity of the market reaction to news or external influences accelerate on the approach to this transition. Accordingly, the crash hazard rate follows a similar process, namely
where B is a positive constant and t c is the critical time of the bubble death. The exponent b must lie between 0 and 1 for an important economic reason : otherwise, the price would go to infinity when approaching t c (if the bubble has not crashed yet).
We stress that t c is not the time of the crash because the crash could happen at any time before t c , even though this is not very likely. t c is the most probable time of the crash. There exists a residual probability
of attaining the critical date without crash. This residual probability is crucial for the coherence of the story, because otherwise the whole model would unravel because rational agents would anticipate the crash. Plugging equation (10) into Equation (4) gives the following law for price:
where β = 1 − b ∈ (0, 1) and p c is the price at the critical time (conditioned on no crash having been triggered). We see that the price before the crash also follows a power law. It has a finite upper bound p c . The slope of the price, which is the expected return per unit of time, becomes unbounded as we approach the critical date. This is to compensate for an unbounded hazard rate approaching t c .
Log-periodicity
The power law dependence (10) of the hazard rate is the hallmark a self-similarity of the market across scales as the critical time t c is approached : at the critical point, an ocean of traders who are mostly bearish may have within it several islands of traders who are mostly bullish, each of which in turns surrounds lakes of bearish traders with islets of bullish traders; the progression continues all the way down to the smallest possible scale: a single trader [17] . Intuitively speaking, critical self-similarity is why local imitation cascades through the scales into global coordination. This critical state occurs when local influences propagate over long distances and the average state of the system becomes exquisitely sensitive to a small perturbation, i.e., different parts of the system becomes highly correlated.
As we said, scale invariance of a system near its critical point must be represented by power law dependences of the observables [18] . Formally, these power laws are the solution of the renormalisation group equations [17, 19] which describe the correlations of the agents at many scales. It turns out that the most general mathematical solutions of these renormalisation group equations are power laws with complex exponents, i.e., present log-periodic corrections to scaling [20] .
A straightforward mechanism for these complex exponents to appear is that the dynamics be defined on a hierarchical structure displaying a discrete scale invariance. Schematically, we can think of the stock market made of actors which differs in size by many orders of magnitudes ranging from individuals to gigantic professional investors, such as pension funds. Furthermore, structures at even higher levels, such as currency influence spheres (US$, Euro, YEN ...), exist and with the current globalisation and de-regulation of the market one may argue that structures on the largest possible scale, i.e., the world economy, are beginning to form. This means that the structure of the financial markets have features which resembles that of hierarchical systems with "traders" on all levels of the market. Of course, this does not imply that any strict hierarchical structure of the stock market exists, but there are numerous examples of qualitatively hierarchical structures in society. Models [2, 13] of imitative interactions on hierarchical structures recover the power law behavior (12) and predict that the critical exponent β can be a complex number! Recently, it been realized that discrete scale invariance and its associated complex exponents may appear "spontaneously" in non-hierarchical systems, i.e., without the need for a pre-existing hierarchy (see [20] for a review). There are many dynamical mechanisms that can operate to produce these complex exponents, such as non-local geometry, frozen heterogeneity [21] , cascades of instabilities, intermittent amplifications, (see [11] for such a mechanism in the context of "anti-bubbles" found recently in the Japanese stock market), and so on.
As a consequence, we are led to generalize (10) and give the first order expansion of the general solution for the hazard rate
The crash hazard rate now displays log-periodic oscillations. The evolution of the price before the crash and before the critical date is given by:
where φ 1 is another phase constant. The key feature is that oscillations appear in the price of the asset before the critical date. The local maxima of the function are separated by time intervals that tend to zero at the critical date, and do so in geometric progression, i.e., the ratio of consecutive time intervals is a constant
This is very useful from an empirical point of view because such oscillations are much more strikingly visible in actual data than a simple power law : a fit can "lock in" on the oscillations which contain information about the critical date t c . We note that these log-periodic structure bear some similarity with patterns classified empirically by chartists using methods of technical analysis, such as the "Elliott waves" [22] and the "log-spirals" [23] . For instance, a logarithmic spiral in the plane obeys the equation r = r 0 e aθ in polar coordinate. The intersections with the x axis occur for θ = nπ (recall that
π/2+ nπ (recall that y = r sin θ) and the corresponding coordinates are y n = (−1) e aπ/2 e aπn . Both series indeed form discrete geometrical series with a scaling ratio λ = e aπ similar to (15) . We do not need however to stress the difference between a pattern recognition approach [23] and our economically motivated approach incorporating a rational model of imitative agents as well as well-established tools from statistical physics.
3 Empirical results
Are large crashes special?
Recently, a statistical analysis of market fluctuations [24] has provided significant indications that large crashes may be outliers. It was established that the distribution of draw-downs thresholded at 1% of the Dow Jones Average daily closing below ≈ 15% is well described by an exponential distribution with a decay constant of ≈ 2%. Extrapolating this result to, e.g., the 3 largest crashes on Wall Street in this century (1914, 1929 and 1987) yield a recurrence time of ≈ 50 centuries for each single crash.
In the following, we use the generic term "crash" to refer to the significant drop of a market occurring over a few days to a few weeks which follows an extended period of bullish behaviour and signifies the end of the bubble.
As an additional null-hypothesis, 10.000 synthetic data sets, each covering a time-span of a century and adding up to ≈ 10 6 years, have been generated using a GARCH(1,1) model estimated from the true index with a t-student distribution with four degrees of freedom [25] . This analysis [2] showed that only two data sets had 3 draw downs above 22% and none had 4. However, 3 of these 6 "crashes" were preceded by a draw up of comparable size of the draw down and hence showed an abnormal behaviour not found for real crashes. This means that in approximately one million years of "Garch-trading", with a reset every century, never did 3 crashes occur in a single century.
This suggest that different mechanisms may be responsible for large crashes and that pre-cursory patterns might exist decorating the speculative bubble preceding the crash.
Log-periodic analysis of large crashes
Details on our numerical procedure are given in [2, 3] and will not be reproduced here. (14) is shown as a continuous line for each event. Table 1 lists the key parameters of the fit and data. Note the small fluctuations in the value of the scaling ratio 2.2 ≤ λ ≤ 2.8 for all data sets except the CHF. This agreement cannot be accidental and constitutes one of the key test of our framework.
In order to qualify further the significance of the log-periodic oscillations in a nonparametric way as well as providing an independent test on the value of the frequency of the log-periodic oscillations and hence the prefered scaling ration λ, we have eliminated the leading trend from the price data by the transformation Table 1 : t c is the critical time predicted from the fit of the market index to the equation (14) . The other parameters β, ω 1 and λ of the fit are also shown. The fit is performed up to the time t max at which the market index achieved its highest maximum before the crash. t min is the time of the lowest point of the market disregarding smaller "plateaus". The percentage drop is calculated from the total loss from t max to t min .
This transformation should produce a pure cos[ω 1 log(t c − t) + φ 1 ] if equation (14) was a perfect description. In figure 5 , we show the residue for the bubble prior to the 1987 crash. We see a very convincing periodic trend as a function of log tc−t tc . The significance of this trend has been estimated using a so-called Lomb periodogram since the data is not equidistantly sampled in time. The Lomb periodogram is a local fit of a cosine (with a phase) using some user chosen range of frequencies. In figure 6 , we see a peak around f ≈ 1.1 for all 8 cases shown in figures 1 to 4 corresponding to ω 1 = 2πf ≈ 7 in perfect agreement with the results listed in table 1. Since the "noise" spectrum is unknown and very likely different for each crash, we cannot estimate the confidence interval of the peak and compare the results for the different crashes. Therefore, only the relative level of the peak for each separate periodogram can be taken as a measure of the significance of the oscillations and the periodograms have hence been normalised.
Note also, that the strength of the oscillations is ≈ 5 − 10% of the leading power law behaviour for all 8 cases signifying that they cannot be neglected.
Are log-periodic signatures statistically significant?
In the case of the 1929 and 1987 crashes on Wall Street, log-periodic oscillations in the index could be identified as long as ≈ 7.5 years prior to the crashes [12] . In order to investigate the significance of these results, we picked at random fifty 400-week intervals in the period 1910 to 1996 of the Dow Jones average and launched the same fitting procedure as on the time period prior to the 1929 and 1987 crashes on Wall Street. The results were encouraging. Of 11 fits with a quality (specifically, the variance of the fit of equation (18) with τ = t c − t to the data) comparable with that of the 2 crashes, only six data sets produced values for β, ω 1 , ω 2 and T 1 , which were in the same range. However, these fits all belonged to the periods prior to the crashes of 1929, 1962 and 1987. The existence of a "crash" in 1962 was before these results unknown to us and the identification of this crash naturally strengthens the case. We refer the reader to [2] for a presentation of the best fit obtained for this "crash".
We also generated 1000 synthetic data sets of length 400 weeks using the same GARCH(1,1) model used in section 3.1. Each of these 1000 data sets was analysed in the same manner as the real crashes. In 66 cases, the best minima had values similar to the real crashes, but all of these fits, except two, did not resemble the true stock market index prior to the 1929 and 1987 crashes on Wall Street, the reason primarily being that they only had one or two oscillations. However, two fits looked rather much like that of the 1929 and 1987 crashes [2, 3] .
This result correspond approximately to the usual 95 % confidence interval for one event. In contrast, we have here provided several examples of log-periodic signatures before large stock market crashes.
Log-periodicity in bearish markets?
Stock market jargon divide the stock markets trends into either "bullish" or "bearish". If log-periodic signals, apparently, are present in "bullish" markets, the obvious question to ask is whether this is also the case in "bearish" markets.
The most recent example of a genuine long-term depression comes from Japan, where the Nikkei has decreased by ≈ 60 % since 31 Dec. 1989. In figure 7 , we see (the logarithm of) the Nikkei from 31 Dec. 1989 until 31 Dec. 1998. The 3 fits are equations (17), (18) and (19) respectively [11] :
where τ = t − t c . Eq.(19) predicts the transition from the log-frequency ω 1 close to t c to ω 1 + ω 2 for T 1 < τ < T 2 and to the log-frequency ω 1 + ω 2 + ω 3 for T 2 < τ . The equations (18) (resp. (19)) extend the renormalisation group approach to the second (resp. third) order of perturbation [11, 12] . The interval used for the first equation (17) is until mid-1992 and for the second equation (18) until mid-1995. The parameter values produced by the different fits with equations (17) and (18) agree remarkably well and the values for the exponent β also agree well as shown in table 1. The fit with (19) was, due to the large number of free variables, performed differently and the parameter values for t c , β, and ω 1 determined from the fit with (18) was kept fixed and only T 1 , T 2 , ω 2 , ω 3 and φ 3 where allowed to adjust freely. What lends credibility to the fit with equation (19) is, as seen from the caption of figure 7 , that despite it complex form, we get values for the two cross-over time scales T 1 , T 2 which correspond very nicely to what is expected from the theory: T 1 has moved down to ≈ 4.4 years in agreement with the time interval used for equation (18) and T 2 is ≈ 7.8 years, which is compatible with the 9 year interval of the fit. This does not mean that fitting is not very degenerate, it is, but the ranking of T 1 and T 2 is always the same and the values given do not deviate much from the ones in the caption of figure 7, i.e., by ± one unit.
The value ω 1 ≈ 4.9 correspond to λ ≈ 3.6, which is not in the range found for the bubbles, see table 1. An additional difference between the anti-bubble in the Nikkei and these other cases is the strength of the oscillations compared to the leading behaviour. For
Log-periodic analysis of the Russian stock market
Intrigued by the claims of K. Ilinski [15] of a genuine stock market bubble followed by a crash without log-periodic signatures on the Russian stock market, we have analysed 4 Russian stock market indices from their start up til present. The 4 indices was The Russian Trading System Interfax Index (IRTS), The Agence Skate Press Moscow Times Index (ASPMT), The Agence Skate Press General Index (ASPGEN) and The Credit Suisse First Boston Russia Index (ROSI). The ROSI is generally considered the best of the 4 and we will put emphasis on the results obtained with that index. As we shall return to later, the Russian stock market is highly volatile, which means that great care must be taken in maintaining a representative stock market index. This is the primary reason for using 4 indices in the analysis.
In figure 8 , we see the ROSI fitted with equation (14) in the interval [96.21 : 97.61]. The interval is chosen by identifying the start of the bubble and the end represented by the date of the highest value of the index before the crash. For all 4 indices, the same start-and end-day could be identified ±1 day.
As can seen from table 2, the non-dimensional parameters β, ω 1 and λ as well as the predicted time of the crash t c for the fit to the different indices agree very well except for the exponent β obtained from the ASPGEN Index. In fact, the value obtained for the prefered scaling ratio λ is with < ±5% for the 4 fits showing numerical stability. Table 2 : t c is the predicted time of the crash from the fit of the market index to the equation (14) . The non-dimensional parameters β , ω 1 and λ of the fits to the preceding bubble are also given. The fit to the bubble is performed up to the time at which the market index achieved its highest maximum before the crash. The parameters t ′ c , β ′ , ω ′ 1 and λ ′ correspond to the fit with equation (14), where t c and t has been interchanged. Here t ′ max and t ′ min represent the endpoints of the interval fitted.
The origin of this bubble is well-known. In 1996 large international investors (read US, German and Japanese) began to invest heavily in the Russian markets believing that the financial situation of Russia had finally stabilised. Nothing was further from the truth [26] but the belief and hope in a new investment haven with large returns led to the herding and bubble development. This means that the same herding, which created the log-periodic bubbles on Wall Street (1929, 1987, 1998) , Hong Kong (1997) and the Forex (1985 Forex ( , 1998 , entered an emerging market and brought along the same log-periodic trends characterising the global markets. The fact that the consistent values of λ obtained for the 4 indices of the Russian market is comparable to that of the Wall Street, Hong Kong and Forex crashes supports this interpretation. Furthermore, it supports the idea of the stock market as a self-organising complex system of surprising robustness.
Inspired by this clear evidence of log-periodic oscillations decorating the power law acceleration signaling a bubble in the Russian stock market, we extended our analysis and search for possible log-periodic signatures in the "anti-bubble" that followed the log-periodic bubble described above.
Recently, as described in section 3.4, it has been documented that the recent decay of the Japanese Nikkei index starting 1. Jan 1990 up til present can be excellently model by a log-periodically decorated power law decay. In figure 9 , we show the ROSI index for the "anti-bubble", signaling the collapse of the Russian stock market, fitted with equation (14) where t c and t has been interchanged. We use the price and not the logarithm of the price to keep the symmetry with the description of the bubble and from the consideration of the relatively short time scales involved.
In table 2, the corresponding values for t c , β , ω 1 and λ are listed. The agreement between the bubble and the anti-bubble with respect to the values of the non-dimensional variables β ′ , ω ′ 1 and λ ′ as well as t c is surprisingly good. However, the numerical stability of the result for the anti-bubble cannot be compared with that of the preceding bubble and depends on the index as well as the endpoint of the interval used in the fitting. However, the "symmetry" around t c is rather striking considering the nature of the data and quite visible to the naked eye.
There are (at least) two reasons for the numerical instability of the fit to the antibubble. First, as an emerging market in decay the Russian stock market is too volatile for a smooth function as a cosine to capture and we are currently investigating alternative parametrisations [27] . Second, the "noise" in the Russian indices was very large in that period, in particular due to the "depletion" of stocks. This is clearly illustrated by the heavy rearrangement that the ASPGEN and related indices went through following Aug. 17, 1998 .
In figure 11 , we see the spectral analysis for the bubble and anti-bubble. Whereas the agreement between the periodogram and the fit with equation (14) is excellent (within 1%), the deviation for the anti-bubble is ≈ 5%. Furthermore, the residue for the anti-bubble used in the frequency analysis shown in figure 11 was truncated by a few weeks due to an increasing deviation between data and fit.
Conclusion
We have presented a synthesis of the available empirical evidence in the light of recent theoretical developments for the existence of characteristic log-periodic signatures of growing bubbles in a variety of stock markets. We have here documented 8 unrelated crashes from 1929 to 1998, on stock markets as diverse as the US, Hong-Kong or the Russian market and on currencies. In addition, we discovered a significant bubble in 1962 [2] as well as "anti-bubbles" on the Nikkei since 1990 and the Gold (after the 1980 bubble maximum) [11] as well as on the Russian index after 1997.6. To our knowledge, no major financial crash preceded by an extended bubble has occurred in the past 2 decades without exhibit similar log-periodic signature. In this context, note that the novel analysis of the Russian index presented here was motivated by Ilinski's claim of a crash without log-periodic signature, which we have shown to be incorrect.
All these results, taken together with the remarkable robustness and consistency of the estimation of the exponent β as well as the more important statistics the scaling ratio λ, make the case for log-periodicity very strong. In our opinion, one can no more ignore this very specific and strong signature which is characteristic of developing bubbles and this calls for further investigations to unravel in more depths the underlying economical, financial and behavioural mechanisms.
These different cases, together with the 1962 "slow event" as well as the "anti-bubbles", show that the log-periodic critical theory applies both to bubbles ending in a sudden crash as well as to bubbles landing smoothly. This is in fact a strong prediction of our rational model of imitative behaviour. figure 9 . The significance of the peak should be estimated against the noise level.
